States Versus Tribes: The Problem of Multiple Taxation of Non-Indian Oil and Gas Leases on Indian Reservations by Erhardt, Erin Marie
American Indian Law Review
Volume 38 | Number 2
1-1-2014
States Versus Tribes: The Problem of Multiple
Taxation of Non-Indian Oil and Gas Leases on
Indian Reservations
Erin Marie Erhardt
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons,
Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Taxation-State and Local Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
American Indian Law Review by an authorized administrator of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation
Erin M. Erhardt, States Versus Tribes: The Problem of Multiple Taxation of Non-Indian Oil and Gas Leases on Indian Reservations, 38 Am.






STATES VERSUS TRIBES: THE PROBLEM OF MULTIPLE 
TAXATION OF NON-INDIAN OIL AND GAS LEASES ON 
INDIAN RESERVATIONS 
Erin Marie Erhardt* 
I. Introduction 
Taxation of business operations on Indian land presents a murky issue, 
particularly when the business operations involve non-tribal members 
engaging in business on Indian lands.  One context where this issue often 
arises is in the field of natural resources.  Because oil and gas are such 
important commodities, not just on and off American Indian reservations, 
but across the world, and because oil and gas transactions require a certain 
level of expertise, tribal dealings with non-Indians in this area are almost 
inevitable. 
The central issue of this Note examines whether states may tax the 
operations of nontribal on-reservation businesses.  Recently, the Ute 
Mountain Ute Tribe of New Mexico challenged state taxation of oil and gas 
leases on their lands.1  While the district court determined that the state had 
no authority to tax the operations, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ute 
Mountain Ute Tribe v. Rodriguez2 disagreed, following in the footsteps of 
the United States Supreme Court in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New 
Mexico.3  However, that decision was incorrect: state taxes of nonmember 
oil and gas operations on reservations must be analyzed on a case-by-case 
basis.  Rodriguez should be distinguished from Cotton in a few, significant 
ways.  Rodriguez presents an instance where state taxes on oil and gas 
production on reservations by nonmembers should be prohibited. 
II. Law Before the Case  
Taxation of non-Indians participating in business on Indian reservations 
has been an unanswered question for almost a century. There are three 
                                                                                                                 
 * Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. Homans, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1260 (D.N.M. 2009), 
rev'd sub nom. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 2. 660 F.3d 1177, 1180 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1557 (2012).  
 3. 490 U.S. 163 (1989). 
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potential taxation levels for these individuals or entities: federal taxation, 
state taxation, and tribal taxation. 
A. Federal Taxation 
The authority of the United States federal government to tax Indian tribes 
is uncontested.  Article I of the U.S. Constitution allows Congress “[t]o 
regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.”4  To this end, Congress has 
enacted legislation specifically designed to help clarify the treatment of 
Indian tribes with regard to federal taxation schemes.5 
B. Tribal Taxation 
The authority of tribes to impose taxes on non-Indians on their 
reservations is also uncontested.  The ability to tax is “an essential attribute 
of Indian sovereignty” and is “a necessary instrument of self-government 
and territorial management.”6  This taxing authority comes from the tribe’s 
“general authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity within its 
jurisdiction,” rather than from its power to exclude non-Indians from its 
lands.7  Thus, courts continue to uphold tribal taxation of non-Indians 
entering their reservations for the purpose of engaging in business.8 
Over time, the criteria for determining whether a tribe may tax non-
members within the limits of the reservation has been narrowed to a single 
test, known as the Montana Test.9 This test concedes that tribes may not 
generally regulate non-members within their lands unless: (1) the non-
Indians have entered a consensual business relationship with the tribe or its 
members or (2) the non-Indian conduct directly affects the “political 
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”10   
While these two exceptions have been narrowed by recent Supreme Court 
decisions, energy development on Indian reservations can still trigger both 
exceptions.11 
                                                                                                                 
 4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 5. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7871 (2012). 
 6. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Heather J. Tanana & John C. Ruple, Energy Development in Indian Country: 
Working Within the Realm of Indian Law and Moving Towards Collaboration, 32 UTAH 
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 16 (2012). 
 9. Bethany C. Sullivan, Note, Changing Winds: Reconfiguring the Legal Framework 
for Renewable-Energy Development in Indian Country, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 823, 836 (2010); 
see also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
 10. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66. 
 11. Tanana & Ruple, supra note 8, at 16-17. 
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In addition to the contraction of these exceptions, tribes have, over time, 
seen the erosion of their taxing power in general.12 This problem is 
exacerbated by the authorization of federal and state taxes within the 
jurisdictions of tribal taxes.13  The imposition of state taxes hinders the 
ability of tribes to levy their own taxes, decreases the value to the tribes of 
oil and gas leases, and makes on-reservation leasing less attractive to 
contractors.14   
C. State Taxation 
1. Congressional Approval 
While federal and tribal authority to levy taxes on non-Indians is mostly 
settled, state authority has remained an open question for nearly a century.  
Generally, states cannot tax tribes or tribal members engaging in business 
on Indian reservations.15  The exception to this rule occurs when Congress 
has explicitly authorized taxation.16  Courts may not allow state taxation on 
tribal members on reservations under an ambiguous statute.17  However, 
tribal members are subject to state taxation on activities in which they 
participate off reservation.18  The remaining question, then, concerns state 
taxation of on-reservation activities of non-Indians.19  
Federal authorization of state taxation on Indian reservations has 
changed dramatically over time.  In 1832, the Supreme Court declared that 
a “[s]tate has no jurisdiction at all within the boundaries of a reservation.”20  
However, over a century later the Court adjusted this rule to consider the 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Angelique A. EagleWoman, The Philosophy of Colonization Underlying Taxation 
Imposed upon Tribal Nations Within the United States, 43 TULSA L. REV. 43, 50 (2007). For 
a detailed discussion of the erosion of tribal taxing power, see Philip P. Frickey, A Common 
Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over 
Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 49 (1999). 
 13. EagleWoman, supra note 12, at 50. 
 14. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 186-87 (1989).  
 15. Mark J. Cowan, Double Taxation in Indian Country: Unpacking the Problem and 
Analyzing the Role of the Federal Government in Protecting Tribal Governmental Revenues, 
2 PITTSBURGH TAX REV. 93, 108 (2005). 
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See generally Cotton, 490 U.S. 163 (1989); Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau 
of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 
(1980); Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 20. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. Homans, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1276 (D.N.M. 2009) 
(citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832)). 
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state’s legitimate interest in regulating non-Indians, and “whether the state 
action infringe[s] on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws 
and be ruled by them.”21  States generally cannot tax on-reservation activity 
unless Congress has expressly authorized that taxation.22 
In 1891, Congress first authorized mineral leasing on statutory and treaty 
(but not executive) reservations.23  Thirty-three years later, in 1924, 
Congress enacted the first legislation related to the taxation of oil and gas 
production on Indian lands.24  “The 1924 Act provided expressly for state 
taxation of oil and gas produced from Indian lands,”25 waiving tribes’ 
intergovernmental sovereign immunity in that area.26   Thus, treaty and 
statutory reservations were immune from state taxation from 1891 until 
1924.  
Since 1924, Congress has enacted two laws that have been used by 
proponents to argue that state authority to tax has been nullified.  In 1938, 
Congress enacted the Indian Mineral Leasing Act (IMLA).27  The IMLA 
had three stated purposes: first, to provide uniformity in Indian land leasing; 
second, to harmonize leasing with the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934;28 
and third, to ensure Indian owners receive the highest return on income 
derived from their property.29 However, this Act did nothing to change the 
state tax structure affecting oil and gas businesses on Indian lands.30  
Indeed, while part of the purpose of the IMLA was to make sure that the 
Indians receive “the greatest return on the income derived from their 
property,”31 Congress never intended that this Act remove all possible 
hurdles to tribal profit maximization.32  Notably, the Supreme Court refused 
to accept the assertion that the IMLA’s silence on the issue of taxation 
repealed the 1924 Act’s authorization of state taxation.33 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 271 (1959).   
 22. Id. at 223.  
 23. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d at 1192. 
 24. Id. at 1193; see 25 U.S.C. § 398 (2012). 
 25. EagleWoman, supra note 12, at 55. 
 26. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d at 1193. 
 27. 25 U.S.C. § 396a (2012). 
 28. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2012). 
 29. EagleWoman, supra note 12, at 56. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Tanana & Ruple, supra note 8, at 18 (citing Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New 
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 180 (1989)). 
 33. Cotton, 490 U.S. at 182. 
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Congress next addressed oil and gas on Indian lands with the passage of 
the Indian Mineral Development Act (IMDA), enacted in 1982.34  Similar 
to the IMLA, the purpose of the IMDA is to “maximize the economic return 
to a tribe for its oil and gas,”35 and, like the IMLA, the IMDA is silent on 
the issue of state taxation.36  However, this Act allows the Secretary of the 
Interior to “promulgate regulations to implement the IMDA.”37  Again, 
courts refuse to accept the assertion that this Act repeals the 1924 Act’s 
authorization of state taxes. 
2. Judicial Approval 
The Supreme Court has developed a second approach to determine 
whether a state has jurisdiction.38  A state may sometimes be able to prove a 
compelling enough interest to warrant state taxes even without 
congressional approval.39 When determining the validity of state taxes, 
courts must consider tribal sovereignty as a backdrop against which all 
other laws must be interpreted.40  Courts should look at: (1) the federal 
interest in on-reservation activity; (2) the tribal interest in the operation; and 
(3) the state’s interest in taxing the operation.41  It is worth noting that a 
state tax is not immediately invalidated solely because the economic burden 
falls on the tribe.42 
 The first two major Supreme Court decisions to address the problem of 
double taxation, White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker43 and Ramah 
Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue,44 both denied the 
imposition of state taxes over non-Indians engaging in on-reservation 
activities. In denying states this authority, both cases made clear that the 
analysis used to determine whether or not state taxes are preempted is 
flexible and depends on the facts of the specific case.45 
                                                                                                                 
 34. 25 U.S.C. § 2012 (2012). 
 35. Thomas W. Fredericks, Freeing Indian Energy Development from the Grips of 
Cotton: Advancing Energy Independence for Tribal Nations, FED. LAW., Apr. 2013, at 57, 
58. 
 36. 25 U.S.C. § 2012 (2012). 
 37. Fredericks, supra note 35, at 58. 
 38. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). 
 39. Tanana & Ruple, supra note 8, at 18. 
 40. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1980). 
 41. Id. at 149-50. 
 42. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d 1177, 1201 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 43. 448 U.S. 136. 
 44. 458 U.S. 832 (1982). 
 45. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 183-84 (1989). 
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Bracker addressed whether a state’s motor carrier license and use fuel 
taxes applied to a non-tribal member logging company operating solely on 
roads within a reservation.46  In resolving this case, the Supreme Court 
developed a balancing test to determine whose interests were most 
pervasive and therefore whether state taxes should apply.47  This test, often 
referred to as the Bracker Balancing Test,48 weighs the state, federal, and 
tribal interests at stake by considering three factors.49  First, courts consider 
the extent of the federal and tribal regulations governing the taxed 
activities.50  Second, courts consider whether the economic burden of the 
tax falls on the non-Indian individual or entity or on the tribe or tribal 
members.51  Third, courts consider the extent of the state interests in the 
taxation.52  Finally, when deciding whether or not the Bracker test applies, 
courts must consider on whom the legal incidence of the tax falls and where 
the taxable event occurs.53   
In Bracker, the Court decided that the federal and tribal regulations were 
so pervasive that there was neither room nor reason to impose state taxation 
or regulations.54  The imposition of state taxes would also hinder both the 
tribe’s ability to comply with the sustainability policies prescribed by the 
federal government55 and the federal government’s ability to set fees and 
rates related to the harvest of the timber.56 It was undisputed that the 
incidence of the taxes fell on the tribe.57  Finally, the parties offered no 
evidence of “any regulatory function or services performed by the State that 
would justify the assessment of taxes for activities on Bureau and tribal 
roads within the reservation.”58  The roads cost the State nothing and the 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 137-38. 
 47. Id. at 145. 
 48. The term “Bracker balancing” was originally coined by the District Court of New 
Mexico in Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. Homans, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1279 (D.N.M. 2009).  
The Supreme Court has previously used the term “Bracker interest-balancing test.” Wagnon 
v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 100 (2005). 
 49. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 148, 150-51. 
 50. Id. at 148. For a discussion of the federal regulatory scheme governing timber 
activities on the Fort Apache Reservation, see generally id. at 146-50. 
 51. Id. at 151. 
 52. Id. at 150. 
 53. Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 105-106. 
 54. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 152. 
 55. Id. at 149-50. 
 56. Id. at 149. 
 57. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 184 (1989) (citing Bracker, 
448 U.S. at 151). 
 58. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 148-49. 
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State had no control over them; therefore, the State had no reason to require 
revenues from their use.59  Thus, all three prongs of the Bracker Balancing 
Test tipped in favor of the Tribe and the state taxes were consequently 
preempted.   The next major case to apply the Bracker Balancing Test to 
preempt state taxes was Ramah, which involved taxation of a non-Indian 
construction company constructing a school for Indian children on Indian 
land.60  
While state taxation is supposedly checked by this Bracker Balancing 
Test, considering the interests of all parties involved and weighing towards 
the tribal and federal interests in any instance of ambiguity, “this check 
appears to have been watered down by the Court over time,”61 particularly 
by the seminal oil and gas taxation case, Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New 
Mexico.62 
Cotton represents a major turning point for state taxation of non-Indians 
on Indian lands.  Cotton recognized that tribal taxes on oil and gas severed 
by non-Indians on Indian reservations, under that specific fact pattern were 
valid.63 The Rodriguez court found this case particularly persuasive because 
it involved the same five taxes.64 
In applying the Bracker Balancing Test, the Supreme Court substantially 
distinguished Cotton from Bracker and Ramah, and upheld state taxation of 
the non-Indian on-reservation activities.  The Court determined that because 
the State “regulates the spacing and mechanical integrity of wells located 
on the reservation,” the federal and tribal regulatory schemes are extensive, 
but not exclusive.65  The State additionally “provides substantial services to 
both the Jicarilla Tribe and Cotton costing the State approximately $3 
million per year,”66 indicating a legitimate state interest in raising revenues 
from the on-reservation activities.  While the amount of taxes paid by the 
tribe significantly outweighs the cost of the services to the state, the Court 
points out that neither Bracker nor Ramah required a proportionality 
analysis as part of the test; they merely required showing a legitimate state 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Cotton, 490 U.S. at 184. 
 60. Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 834 (1982). 
 61. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 838. 
 62. See Cotton, 490 U.S. 163. 
 63. Id. at 190-91. 
 64. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d 1177, 1188-89 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 65. Cotton, 490 U.S. at 186. 
 66. Id. at 185 (internal quotations omitted). 
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interest.67  Finally, the Court noted that absolutely no economic burden 
from the taxes fell on the tribe.68  
In this case, all three factors of the Bracker Balancing Test appear to tip 
in favor of the State.69  This puts Cotton on the complete opposite end of 
the scale from Bracker and Ramah.  
III. Statement of the Case 
Courts now have an established framework against which they can 
examine disputes arising between tribes and states.  However, most of the 
major cases have fallen entirely to one side of the analysis: either all three 
factors tip in favor of the tribe, as in Bracker and Ramah, or all three tip in 
favor of the state, as in Cotton.  But what happens when the facts are less 
dispositive, when some factors tip in favor of the tribe and others for the 
state?  This question was presented in Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. 
Rodriguez.70  
In Rodriguez, the U.S. District Court for New Mexico and the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals were asked to decide “whether federal law 
preempts five state taxes imposed on non-Indian lessees extracting oil and 
gas from the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation (“Ute Reservation”) in New 
Mexico.”71  
The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe (UMUT) is a federally recognized 
American Indian Tribe with roughly 2000 members.72  The Ute Reservation 
spans across three states: New Mexico, Utah, and Colorado.73  Originally 
established by treaty in 1868, Congress has twice reduced the size of this 
reservation; consequently, the reservation is both a treaty and statutory 
reservation, but not an executive reservation.74  The portion of the 
reservation in New Mexico is used only for grazing and the extraction of 
minerals.75  There are no “state-regulated or state-maintained roads or other 
infrastructure” on the reservation land in New Mexico.76 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 185-86. 
 70. 660 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 71. Id. at 1179. 
 72. Id. at 1180. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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Under the IMLA77 and the IMDA,78 the UMUT is authorized, subject to 
approval by the Secretary of the Interior, to execute mineral leases and 
mineral development agreements.79  As of July 2011, the Ute Reservation 
hosts 186 active oil and gas wells, operated by twelve oil and gas 
companies.80  Natural gas is the reservation’s main resource; oil is 
secondary.81 
The Tenth Circuit found that the federal laws and regulations concerning 
oil and gas operations on Indian land, control “virtually every aspect” of the 
operations on the Ute Reservation.82  However, the court conceded that the 
Oil and Conservation Division of the New Mexico Energy, Minerals, and 
Natural Resources Department (NMOCD) does have a minor role on the 
reservation:83 the Bureau of Land Management has adopted the same 
standards for well spacing and well setbacks as those promulgated by the 
NMOCD.84  Additionally, the State provides some optional on-reservation 
services to non-Indian operators, such as a hearing process for resolving 
disputes between operators, publicly available geologic records and 
production records, and records of transfers and sales.85  These services are 
rarely, if ever, actually used. 86 
In addition to the federal and tribal taxes imposed, the State of New 
Mexico imposes five state taxes on non-Indian oil and gas operators 
extracting resources from Indian lands:87 the Oil and Gas Severance Tax, 
the Oil and Gas Conservation Tax, the Oil and Gas Emergency School Tax, 
the Oil and Gas Ad Valorem Production Tax, and the Oil and Gas 
Production Equipment Ad Valorem Tax.88  “Revenues from the Oil and 
Gas Severance Tax are used to meet the State’s debt and put into the State’s 
general fund”;89 “[r]evenues from the Oil and Gas Emergency School Tax 
are [also] put into the State’s general fund.”90  Revenues from the Oil and 
                                                                                                                 
 77. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d at 1180-81. 
 80. Id. at 1181. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1182. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1182-83. 
 86. Id. at 1183. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id.   
 89. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. Homans, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1271 (D.N.M. 2009). 
 90. Id.  
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Gas Ad Valorem Production Tax and the Oil and Gas Ad Valorem 
Production Equipment Tax are primarily allocated to local governments.91  
Finally, “[r]evenues from the Oil and Gas Conservation Tax are partly used 
by the NMOCD to survey and plug abandoned, unplugged, or improperly 
plugged wells and partly put into the State’s general fund.”92  While the 
NMOCD offers these services to the tribe, the NMOCD has never actually 
plugged an abandoned well on the Ute Reservation; the state provides no 
services directly to the UMUT.93  In fact, the UMUT has barred the 
NMOCD from entering the Ute Reservation without permission since 1992 
because the UMUT does not recognize the NMOCD’s authority over oil 
and gas on their lands; rather, the tribe contends that authority is shared by 
the UMUT, the BLM, and the BIA, to the exclusion of the NMOCD.94 
To determine the validity of state taxes, courts must decide whether 
federal law preempts or allows state taxes.  As stated in Part II, the IMLA 
and the IMDA are silent: Congress neither prohibits nor authorizes state 
taxes in either of these statutes.95  Next, courts must look at the background 
of tribal sovereignty with regard to the specific Indian tribe at hand.  Here, 
the Tenth Circuit held that the UMUT’s background of sovereignty did not 
weigh in favor of preemption of state taxes.  While this reservation is a 
treaty and statutory reservation and was immune from state taxation from 
1891 until 1924,96 the Tenth Circuit held that this did not swing the analysis 
in favor of the tribe.97  
Once courts have considered the relevant federal legislation and the 
background of tribal sovereignty, courts apply the Bracker Balancing Test. 
This test examines the weight of the state, federal, and tribal interests at 
issue by looking at three factors: (1) the extent of the federal and tribal 
regulations governing the taxed activity; (2) whether the economic burden 
of the tax falls on the non-Indian individual or entity or tribe; and (3) the 
extent of the state interest in the taxes.98 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. at 1272, 1274. 
 94. Id. at 1270. 
 95. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 96. EagleWoman, supra note 12, at 55. 
 97. Stephanie J. Boehl & Robert L. Mahon, U.S. Supreme Court Update, J. MULTISTATE 
TAX’N & INCENTIVES, Mar.-Apr. 2012, at 44, 45. 
 98. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 148, 150-51 (1980). 
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Courts are attempting to establish a bright line rule to determine when 
the Bracker Balancing Test should be applied.99  The rule looks at whom 
the incident of the tax falls on and where the taxable event occurs.100  The 
district court determined that because the incidence of the tax fell on the 
non-Indian operators and because at least part of the activity, the severance 
of the oil and gas, occurred on the Ute Reservation, the Bracker Balancing 
Test was applicable.101 
Both the New Mexico District Court and the Tenth Circuit followed the 
analysis established by the Supreme Court and relied heavily on the 
precedent set by Cotton to determine whether or not the state taxation was 
valid.102  Each court began by considering the relevant Congressional 
legislation, namely the IMLA and the IMDA.103  Next, the courts looked at 
the UMUT’s specific history of sovereign immunity.  Both courts found the 
historical backdrop notably different from the backdrop in Cotton.  While 
the district court found the difference legally significant,104 the Tenth 
Circuit did not.105 
Finally, the courts considered the extent of the state interests in the taxes.  
The district court and the Tenth Circuit disagreed on this question.  The 
Bracker test requires that the benefits of state taxation raised through on-
reservation activity must specifically apply to the tribe; a general interest in 
raising revenue is not a sufficient state interest.106  While the district court 
found in favor of the tribe,107 the Tenth Circuit found the federal and tribal 
schemes extensive but not exclusive.108  Citing the regulatory support and 
off-reservation infrastructure provided by the State of New Mexico, the 
Tenth Circuit concluded that federal law does not preempt state taxation.109   
                                                                                                                 
 99. Homans, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 1279. 
 100. Id. at 1279-80 (citing Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 100 
& 107 (2005); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458 (1995)). 
 101. Id. at 1280.  
 102. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989). 
 103. See Homans, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 1287; Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. Rodriguez, 660 
F.3d 1177, 1190-92 (10th Cir. 2011). See also discussion supra Part II.C.1. 
 104. Homans, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 1287. 
 105. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d at 1194. 
 106. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 150 (1980). 
 107. Homans, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 1292. 
 108. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d at 1196. 
 109. Id. at 1203. 
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Following the Tenth Circuit decision, the UMUT appealed to the 
Supreme Court; however, the Court denied certiorari on February 21, 
2012.110 
IV. State Taxes Should Not Generally Be Imposed on Non-Indian Oil and 
Gas Production on Indian Lands 
A. This Case Falls Between Cotton on One Hand and Bracker and Ramah 
on the Other 
As mentioned in Part III, the district court and the court of appeals 
differed in their application of the Bracker balancing test.111  While the 
district court found that the backdrop of tribal sovereignty and the 
slightness of the state interest tipped the case in favor of the tribe, the court 
of appeals found that the backdrop of tribal sovereignty was not legally 
significant and that the state interest was sufficiently compelling.112 
The Tenth Circuit found Cotton to be controlling because that case 
involved the same five taxes at issue in Rodriguez.113  However, this case is 
distinguishable from Cotton in a few important ways.  First, the Ute 
Reservation was created by treaty and statute;114 conversely, the Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe reservation, which was at issue in Cotton, was created by 
Executive Order.115  Second, while the district court in Cotton found that 
the economic burden on the tribe was not sufficiently high enough to 
invalidate the state taxes,116 the district court in Rodriguez found that the 
economic burden on the UMUT, while indirect, was substantial.117  These 
distinctions should be considered more carefully to determine which way 
they tip the scale.  
1. Types of Reservations 
Reservations are areas of land permanently reserved for a specific tribe 
as a tribal homeland.118  Historically, reservations have been created three 
ways: by treaty, by an act of Congress, or by an Executive Order or 
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Agreement.119  While reservations may still be allotted, no treaties have 
been made between the United States and Indian tribes since 1871.120  
While the different types of reservations are similar, Congress and the 
courts do not see them as exactly the same.  The history of state taxation of 
on-reservation activities has differed between the different types. While 
treaty and statutory reservations were immune from state taxes from 1891 
until 1924,121 “as to Executive Order reservations, state taxation of 
nonmember oil and gas lessees was the norm from the very start.”122 
The Tenth Circuit in Rodriguez did not find this distinction very 
important or legally significant.123  That was incorrect: the period of 
complete state tax immunity from 1891 until 1924 clearly applies to the 
treaty and statutorily created Ute Reservation.  Executive reservations, like 
the Jicarilla Apache Reservation in Cotton, did not receive this immunity.  
In addition, the question of whether or not state taxes are applicable should 
not even arise under executive reservations. While the question remains 
ambiguous under the IMLA and the IMDA, 25 U.S.C. § 398c specifically 
allows state taxation of leases on executory reservations: “[t]axes may be 
levied and collected by the State or local authority upon improvements, 
outputs of mines or oil and gas wells, or other rights, property, or assets of 
any lessee upon lands within Executive order Indian reservations . . . .”124 
Because treaty and statutory leases have no similar provision, courts should 
infer that the difference in creation and background is significant.  
Accordingly, they should treat this backdrop as “a thumb on the scales” in 
favor of tribes holding treaty and statutory reservations, such as the Ute 
Reservation.125 
2. Incidence of the Economic Burden 
As the dissent in Rodriguez points out, Cotton “strongly suggests” that 
the severity of the economic burden created by taxes on the tribe should be 
determined by the finder of fact: generally, the district court.126  While the 
district court in Cotton found that the economic burden on the tribe was not 
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sufficiently high,127 the district court in Rodriguez came to the opposite 
conclusion.128  Extreme deference should be given to this conclusion. While 
the Rodriguez court recognizes the importance of this deference, it refuses 
to follow it.  
The economic burden of the tax refers to where the incidence of the tax 
falls.  The economic burden on the tribe can be direct or indirect.  A direct 
burden occurs when the incidence or cost of the taxes falls directly on the 
tribe, i.e., the tribe pays the taxes.  An indirect burden, on the other hand, 
happens when someone else pays the tax and passes the cost on to the tribe.  
For instance, the Ramah Court determined that an indirect burden fell on 
the tribe when independent, non-Indian contractors building a school on the 
reservation included the state gross receipts taxes in the price of their 
bids.129  Even though the tax was imposed on another party, because the tax 
was passed on to the tribe, the tribe bore the economic burden of the tax.130  
By the 1940s, it was already established that the indirect economic burden 
of a state tax does not, by itself, invalidate the tax.131  However, the Court 
in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Texas Co. emphasized the slightness of 
the tax at issue, implying that a larger tax might be problematic.132   
Once the determination has been made that the burden of the tax falls on 
the tribe, courts should look at the proportionality of the imposed taxes to 
the amount of services rendered.  The Cotton Court pointed out that neither 
Bracker nor Ramah required a proportionality analysis; they merely 
required a legitimate state interest.133  However, the state did not have a 
legitimate interest in either of those cases.  Therefore, those cases tipped 
entirely in favor of the tribes without needing to go further.  In cases where 
there is a legitimate state interest and the economic burden falls on the tribe, 
either directly or indirectly, courts should take the next step and consider 
the amount of proportionality in determining the validity of the state taxes. 
This does not mean that the amount of the tax or tax burden must not 
exceed the services rendered.  Rather, they must be appropriate under the 
circumstances.  For instance, Cotton Petroleum argued that, while New 
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Mexico did provide its operations with almost $90,000 of services between 
1981 and 1985, the imposition of almost $3,000,000 of state taxes was 
disproportionate to the amount of services rendered.134  The Court rejected 
this argument for two reasons.  First, the services are available to both 
lessees and the tribe, “the intangible value of citizenship in an organized 
society is not easily measured in dollars and cents,” and, most persuasively, 
the actual per capita expenditures for tribe members were equal or greater 
than the expenditures per non-Indian.135  Second, there is no constitutional 
requirement that the tax benefit received by an ordinary commercial 
taxpayer must equal the amount of his or her tax obligations.136 
The taxes at issue in Cotton would have been upheld regardless; even if 
required, the Court would not have reached the proportionality analysis 
because the state had a legitimate interest and because no economic burden 
from the tax fell on the tribe.137  However, the proportionality discussion 
engaged in by the Court provides a good foundation for developing a 
proportionality test.  
Assuming a legitimate state interest, if the economic burden falls on the 
tribe, courts should weigh the amount of the burden suffered by the tribe 
against the amount of services provided.  As early as 1982, the Supreme 
Court speculated that a proportionality assessment might be appropriate.138  
Determining proportionality can be done by considering factors such as 
how substantial the state’s support is, the number of services available to 
the tribe (even if the tribe does not actually partake of all of these services), 
and the per capita state expenditures per tribal member compared to the 
expenditures per non-Indian.  This should be a fact specific, case-by-case 
analysis turning on the totality of the circumstances; no one metric should 
be dispositive.  Similarly, strict dollar-to-dollar proportionality is not 
dispositive; rather, this test is a fairness analysis balancing the interests of 
both parties.    
Rodriguez is much more analogous to Bracker and Ramah than it is to 
Cotton.  The federal and tribal regulations available to the oil and gas 
operators are quite pervasive.  Similarly, the NMOCD and the State of New 
Mexico provide no physical services or infrastructure on the New Mexico 
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lands to either the UMUT or to the oil and gas operators.139  In fact, New 
Mexico provides no services directly to the tribe.140  While the State does 
offer off-reservation services to the tribe, the tribe has never partaken of 
these services.141  The State also offers services such as a hearing process 
for resolving disputes between operators, but these services have never 
been used to resolve disputes between operators on the UMUT lands 
because the tribal and federal remedies are so extensive.142  The NMOCD 
budget for the 2007 fiscal year was $11,132,531.143  It is not possible to 
fully separate the expenditures for the on-reservation wells from the 
expenditures off-reservation.144  The only expense that can be separated is 
the cost of plugging a well; the NMOCD has not plugged a well on the 
UMUT land since at least 1992, and there is no evidence that the NMOCD 
plugged a well on the UMUT land before then.145  While the benefits of the 
services offered off of the UMUT land may be substantial,146 the State 
cannot identify any expenses specifically connected to the maintenance of 
tribal wells.  Additionally, many of the off-reservation services potentially 
offered to the tribe, such as publicly available geologic records,147 would 
remain open to the on-reservation operators, at little to no additional cost to 
the State, even if the state taxes were not imposed.148  For these reasons, the 
proportionality analysis tips in favor of the tribe and the state taxes should 
not be upheld. 
B. Should Cotton Actually Control? 
Overall, Rodriguez is much more analogous with Bracker and Ramah 
than with Cotton. However, because Cotton and Rodriguez involve the 
same five taxes, courts and lawyers are quick to assume the analysis is the 
same.  As illustrated in the case at hand, this assumption is unfounded.  In 
Cotton there was no history of tribal immunity from state taxes, the state 
had a significant state interest, and no incidence of the tax fell on the tribe.  
In Rodriguez, on the other hand, the tribe historically enjoyed some 
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sovereign immunity, the state’s interest was minimal, and the tax incidence 
affected the tribe. 
Homans asks whether Cotton should be broadly construed to hold that 
oil and gas severances from Indian lands by non-Indians may always be 
subject to state taxes, regardless of where on the Bracker scale a specific 
case would fall.149  If so, a fact specific analysis of each case would be 
unnecessary.  Homans specifically rejects this conclusion, stating that 
Cotton “did not create a categorical rule” and “the Bracker analysis 
continues to apply.”150 Rodriguez implicitly agreed by applying the Bracker 
analysis: had Cotton created a general rule, the court would have had no 
reason to employ the Bracker test or indeed partake in any detailed 
analysis; rather, the court should have merely announced that the taxes were 
valid based on precedent and Cotton’s categorical rule.  Because the 
Rodriguez court did not do this, that court accepted the premise that state 
taxes are validated on a fact-specific basis.  Thus, reframing the issue in 
terms of authorization, instead of preemption, is warranted. 
C. Authorization Versus Preemption 
While all legislation actually deals with whether state taxes are 
authorized on Indian lands, the courts always ask whether state taxes are 
preempted.  Courts should reframe their phrasing to better align with the 
real question. While the two questions may sound similar on the surface, 
they are slightly different in their analyses. 
Congress has specifically stated that state taxes may not be imposed 
without express authorization.151  Thus, short of express authorization, 
courts should begin by assuming state taxes are not authorized and 
determine whether there is a legitimate reason to allow the state taxes, 
instead of presuming the taxes are valid and looking for a reason to preempt 
them.  While either phrasing should theoretically come to the same 
conclusion, searching for authorization instead of preemption forces the 
courts to view the cases in the light most favorable to the tribes, who are 
generally the disadvantaged party in negotiations.  
For instance, in enacting the IMDA, the Congressional Committee 
drafting the statute declined to include express taxation authority, choosing 
instead to rely on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.152  This indicates, if 
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anything, Congress’s neutrality on the issue.153  This does not indicate a 
congressional intent to prohibit state taxation, nor does it indicate 
authorization.  The Rodriguez court understood this to mean that, had 
Congress wished to prohibit state taxation with the IMDA, it would have 
specifically done so—looking for preemption.  However, Rodriguez should 
have asked if, after the enactment of the IMDA, state taxation was still 
authorized under the new setup.  While that framing would have in no way 
been dispositive to the case, it would have allowed the court to view the 
legislation more critically and more favorably to the UMUT.  Because 
congressional approval is the prevailing way to authorize state taxes, this 
approach would have been more prudent and should be applied in future 
cases. 
V. Problems of Double Taxation 
Allowing both states and tribes to tax non-Indians engaging in business 
on reservations creates a unique problem of double taxation.154  This 
problem would never be allowed in multistate or international tax 
considerations.155  “In fact, much of the law in the multistate and 
international tax fields is concerned with ensuring that income is taxed no 
more and no less than once.”156  In addition to the economic inequities 
double taxation causes, commentators have raised several other issues 
resulting from the current tax structure, including the assault on tribal 
sovereignty, increased disadvantages of doing business on reservations, and 
advancing the deplorable economic conditions that exist on reservations.  
Furthermore, this is not an issue that affects just this tribe or this 
reservations; this issue affects all Indian tribes engaging in business with 
non-Indians on their lands. 
A. Assault on Indian Sovereignty 
“The Indian’s power to tax can mean little if the states in which 
reservations are located are also permitted to impose taxes on the same 
activities.”157  Through jurisdictional reclassifications, tribes have seen their 
taxing power erode over time.158  Through Supreme Court decisions like 
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Cotton, tribal economic development has been further impeded.159  “[A] 
tribe’s civil regulatory power diminishes the further it moves away from the 
internal governing of its own members,”160 and the more external taxes 
imposed on the tribe the less regulatory power the tribe retains. Without the 
economic burden of federal and state taxes, tribes would be much better 
situated to sustain themselves, rebuild economically, and provide for the 
health and welfare of their members.161  Because of this, some tribes have 
argued that courts should disallow state taxes on non-Indians engaged in 
business on reservations whenever the taxes infringe upon tribal 
sovereignty, regardless of congressional preemption.162 
The imposition of state taxes similarly hinders tribes’ abilities to govern 
themselves.  Some tribes have argued that regardless of congressional 
preemption, courts should eliminate state taxes that pose a threat to Indian 
sovereignty by infringing “on the right of reservation Indians to make their 
own laws and be ruled by them.”163  The Supreme Court has already 
accepted this argument with regard to state laws affecting tribal sovereignty 
within Indian country in non-tax areas.164 For instance, in a 1959 action to 
collect for goods sold on credit,165 the Supreme Court held that the tribal 
courts had broad criminal and civil jurisdiction and that the State of Arizona 
had accepted no such jurisdiction. 166 The Court further held that allowing 
Arizona jurisdiction “would undermine the authority of the tribal courts 
over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the rights of the 
Indians to govern themselves.  It is immaterial that respondent is not an 
Indian.”167 In 1983, the Supreme Court held that the application of New 
Mexico hunting and fishing laws to on-reservation activity “would 
effectively nullify the Tribe’s authority to control hunting and fishing on 
the reservation.”168 
Oil and gas taxes clearly infringe upon tribes’ ability to self-govern.  The 
state taxes make it difficult for the tribes to fund essential services, such as 
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providing for the health and welfare of their members, because the state’s 
taxes decrease the ability of tribes to impose their own taxes and 
consequently decrease tribes’ tax revenues.169  Additionally, tribal funds are 
used to provide oil and gas services, further reducing the amount of money 
available to provide essential services to the tribes.170 
B. Decreasing Attractiveness of Leasing on Indian Lands  
The taxation quagmire created by the imposition of so many levels of 
taxation further discourages businesses from engaging in business on tribal 
lands.171  Due to problems such as the lack of infrastructure and the 
complex and confusing application of commercial laws, businesses are 
often already hesitant to operate on Indian lands.172  The possibility of 
being taxed by both the tribe and the state makes operating on tribal lands 
even less appealing.173  For instance, businesses will receive a lower rate of 
return when doing business on-reservation than they will off-reservation, 
where they are subject to only state and federal taxation.174  Many utility 
companies continue to operate on Indian lands and avoid this problem by 
passing the increased cost off to their customers.175 However, the demands 
of producers and the high competition within the industry are making this 
pass-off more and more difficult.176  
Even the Court in Cotton acknowledged that the imposition of state 
taxation decreases the profitability of oil and gas leases taken on Indian 
lands.177 However, that Court concluded that state taxation similarly 
reduces the profitability of off-reservation leases.178  Following its own 
precedent, that Court further concluded that the indirect burden on the tribe 
caused by the state taxes was insufficient to immunize on-reservation non-
Indian leases from those taxes.179  As explained in this note, that conclusion 
was incorrect. 
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C. Deplorable Economic Conditions on Reservations 
Extreme poverty and other deplorable economic conditions are common 
on most Indian reservations.180  In November 2011, for example, the 
median income of American Indian and Alaska Native households was 
$35,062, compared with a national average of $50,046.181  Additionally, the 
American Indian and Alaska Native poverty rate at that time was 28.4%, 
versus 15.3% for the nation as a whole.182  Twenty-two percent of Indians 
live on reservations, where there are often much worse—living conditions 
than those in third world countries.183  The number of Indians living below 
the poverty line increases dramatically on-reservation, from 28.4% to at 
least 38% and even up to 63%.184 
The double taxation problem significantly contributes to these 
problems.185  The elimination of state taxes would help bring the tribes into 
positions where they can “rebuild economically and independently their 
communities and provide for the health and welfare of tribal members.”186  
This is particularly true with regard to oil and gas operations.  Oil and gas 
are often the only inherent sources of wealth on Indian lands.187  In fact, the 
first efforts to allow state taxation of activities of non-Indians on Indian 
lands stemmed from the identification of oil and gas under those lands.188  
Thus, because the authority of tribes to impose taxes on these activities has 
not been questioned, the decision to allow state taxes gave birth to the issue 
of double taxation.189  
While the imposition of state taxes in some areas may actually benefit 
tribes by encouraging them to start their own businesses, which would be 
exempt from state taxes, this is just one example of why state taxes might 
undeservedly deter tribes from contracting with nonmembers to do 
business.  While tribal businesses spur tribal economic development and 
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enhance tribal self-government, helping to further both goals of the 1934 
IRA,190 this is not a practical solution in the field of natural resource 
operations.  Because particular expertise and equipment is needed to 
efficiently extract and manage minerals, it would be almost impossible for 
tribes to simply start their own production operations, at least in the short 
term.  Thus, tribes are forced to either deal with nonmembers in this area or 
choose not to develop their natural resources, foregoing the potential profits 
from production and risking waste of the precious resources. 
D. An Issue of Nationwide Importance 
Cases such as Rodriguez and Cotton do not just affect the tribes and 
states involved in the cases.  They affect all tribes with oil and gas reserves 
on their reservations, and all states in which those reserves are located.191  
Both states and tribes want to receive as much tax revenue as possible from 
oil and gas severance taxes.192  Also, because of the specialized knowledge 
and infrastructure required in the production of oil and gas, tribes often 
have no choice but to engage in business with nonmembers in this field, 
inexorably implicating the double taxation issue.  Additionally, while cases 
involving Indian affairs may not appear to have widespread ramifications, 
“the growing importance of commercial ventures on Indian reservations 
(e.g., casinos, hotels, mineral rights) and their effect on the state and local 
tax base add significance to such disputes” for all taxing jurisdictions and 
taxpayers, not just tribes and their members.193 
VI. Solutions 
The easiest way to solve the problems and inconsistencies of double 
taxation is through legislation by Congress.  First, Congress could explicitly 
preempt (or allow) state taxes on oil and gas production by non-Indians on 
Indian lands, either in full or in part.  Second, Congress could provide tax 
incentives to encourage tribes and states to work together to resolve tax 
issues among themselves.194  Congress could also provide tax incentives in 
the form of tax credits specifically designed to alleviate this problem.   
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In lieu of specific tax legislation, the federal government could step in to 
help with the enactment of tax compacts between states and tribes.  
Compacts are agreements between tribes and states in which the two parties 
decide to levy one overall tax and divide the proceeds between themselves.  
However, due to unequal bargaining power between the two parties, tribes 
often give away a large part of the tax revenues in order to avoid conflict 
and litigation.195  A better bargaining process could increase the use and 
success of tax compacts as well as work towards solving the double 
taxation problem.   
VII. Conclusion 
The reasons for preempting state taxation of on-reservation non-Indian 
oil and gas operations are numerous and, from a policy standpoint, help to 
increase both the value of the leases and the economic development of 
Indian tribes.  As a matter of law, such taxes should be examined on a case-
by-case basis.  While Cotton was correctly decided, its application is far 
from universal.  The facts in Rodriguez are much more favorable to the 
tribe.  When the state has legitimate interests and the economic burden of 
the taxes fall on the tribe, courts should apply a proportionality analysis in 
addition to the traditional Bracker Balancing Test, weighing not just the 
level of interest of each party but also the specific burdens and benefits of 
the taxes on the parties.  Additionally, courts should frame the question in 
terms of whether the state taxes are authorized, not whether they are 
preempted.  These changes to the traditional test will help increase the 
fairness in oil and gas leases between tribal and non-tribal members as well 
as promote better cooperation and interaction between all parties involved 
in such transactions. 
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